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Snap shot of the Brief at the time of publication. More
evidence is required on this topic. Click here to visit the Brief.
Governments are reliant on expert advice to inform
existing and new climate policies (Christensen and
Velarde, 2019). Over the last decade climate change
advisory bodies have proliferated. They are now in
place in more than 40 countries, varying in expertise
and independence (Averchenkova et al., 2021), and
are a central feature of national climate responses
(Abraham-Dukuma et al., 2020). The first independent
expert climate advisory body was the UK Climate
Change Committee (CCC), established under the 2008
UK Climate Change Act, with similar bodies now in
place in at least Austria (2011), Iceland (2012),
Denmark (2014), Finland (2015), Ireland (2015),
Norway (2017), Sweden (2017), France (2018) and
New Zealand (2019).
The composition and remit of advisory bodies
varies by country. For example, bodies in Austria,
Denmark and Finland are only tasked with providing
advice rather than reviewing government progress
(Nash and Steurer, 2019). Similar to the UK, the Irish
Climate Change Advisory Council undertakes annual
and periodic reviews of government progress, whilst
the Swedish Climate Policy Council submits an annual
progress report, and interim reports, on mitigation
planning to the government. Climate governance differs
in Denmark, which pursues credible commitment
through political party agreements and not the ‘legislate
and delegate’ approach of the UK, and therefore the
Danish Climate Advisory Council was thought to have
had little influence on policy (Lockwood, 2021). The
majority of advisory bodies created by national climate
legislation focus primarily on mitigation (Muinzer,
2019); the UK CCC is notable in that it also has
adaptation as a central focus.
Approach. This ScienceBrief Review examines
emerging evidence of the impact that independent
expert advisory bodies have had on the design and
delivery of ambitious climate policy responses. It
synthesises findings from more than 20 peer−reviewed
scientific articles gathered using ScienceBrief. The
Brief and evidence can be viewed at:
sciencebrief.org/topics/climate-change-
science/independent-advisory-bodies.
Summary. Many countries have established
independent expert advisory bodies as part of their
national policy strategies to tackle climate change.
Such bodies provide evidence to inform
government policy in pursuit of long-term climate
objectives. They monitor progress and help focus
climate change debates on key issues. These
bodies are emerging as strong assets that can help
governments raise ambition and deliver climate
objectives in practice. They can increase public
support for climate action and, by enabling long-
term strategic vision, encourage private
investments. More evidence is needed to assess
the extent to which they are effective in supporting
the delivery of climate objectives.
Key points.
• More than 40 countries have established climate
advisory bodies to assist in the delivery of climate
objectives, varying in expertise and independence.
• Emerging studies suggest such bodies are most
impactful when they are independent from
government, composed of members appointed for
their expertise, small, and well-resourced.
• Recent studies find that these bodies can enhance
climate responses by lending credibility to climate
policies, strengthening public trust, and advising on
feasible and ambitious policy action.
• Limited evidence exists to assess the true
effectiveness of advisory bodies in terms of the
uptake of their advice by governments and their
support of the design and delivery of ambitious
climate targets.
Background. Over 100 countries have stated their
intention to implement net-zero greenhouse gas
emissions commitments to tackle climate change; the
big question is how they will achieve them .
.
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remit of independent advisory bodies in some
countries. For example, the Danish Council on
Climate Change is mandated to create a Climate
Dialogue forum (Weaver et al., 2019). Interviewed
climate change policy experts agreed that climate
change advisory bodies are “essential” for
strengthening public trust, fostering political support
for climate action and increasing the legitimacy and
accountability of policymaking (Averchenkova
2020a: 1); these factors are all considered
“necessary” for a successful net-zero transition in
Europe (ibid). During early stages of the
policymaking process advisory bodies can define
the policy problem through public engagement and
debate (Hoppe et al., 2013), for example expert
advisory commissions in Norway play a vital role in
policy formulation (Christensen and Holst, 2017).
They can provide actionable recommendations.
To have impact, climate advisory bodies must
present findings and reports that can translate into
actionable policies (Abraham-Dukuma et al., 2020).
This is achieved by providing clear, objective,
independent advice that has been assessed for its
political feasibility and meets the government’s
needs (Salacuse, 2018; Sager et al., 2020). The
success of advisory bodies depends on whether
their recommendations align with the needs of
policymakers at the time (Salacuse, 2018). For
expert advice to influence environmental policy-
making it can utilize ‘windows of opportunity’ such
as increased public support for government action
(Rose et al., 2020). For example, an empirical
analysis of the Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution found its advice was more
likely to be implemented by the UK government if it
was provided during a peak of public support for
government action (Owens, 2015).
Advice that has been produced in consultation with
policymakers ensures its relevance to the policymaking
process (Crowley and Head, 2017; Jones et al., 2016;
Groux et al., 2018). For example, in New Zealand the
co-production of advice by an advisory body, scientists,
policy planners and the community enabled collective
decision-making and ensured that the advice provided
to policymakers was policy-usable and legitimate within
the current political context (Duncan et al., 2020).
However, a challenge to be navigated is that the ability
and willingness of political actors to support climate
policy monitoring activities can be limited, for example
in the EU (Schoenefeld et al., 2018).
Reinecke et al., (2013) found that climate advisory
bodies in Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and
Denmark enhance the saliency, credibility and
legitimacy of their advice by:
• being comprised of expert members;
• consulting non-scientific actors in their
deliberations;
• adhering to scientific standards of analysis; and,
• disclosing uncertainties.
Rather than through formal powers, the UK CCC’s
influence is based on reputation and authority
(Lockwood, 2013). It has had several concrete impacts
on national climate policy (see Box 1).
Advisory bodies that are independent from short
term electoral politics are more likely to be
effective and influence policy (Averchenkova 2020a;
Averchenkova et al., 2021). For example, there were
concerns about national advisory bodies in Japan
because they were close to government and lobbyists
and lacked policy analysis expertise, hence they were
not independent and failed to gain the public’s trust
(Crowley and Head, 2017). By contrast the UK CCC is
widely considered to be “a good institutional model for
independent climate advisory bodies” (Nash and
Steurer, 2019). Because of its independent analysis
and scrutiny the UK CCC is widely trusted by
policymakers of all parties (Averchenkova et al., 2018).
One study suggests that for climate change
governance to be effective an independent and
multidisciplinary expert advisory body “will play a key
role” (Abraham-Dukuma et al., 2020).
Advisory bodies need to be small enough to
operate effectively (Göpfert et al., 2019). For example
Averchenkova (2020a) recommends that an EU climate
advisory body should have five to 15 members as this
aligns with the size of climate advisory bodies in
Member States.
Independent expert advisory bodies have
impacted climate policies in different ways:
They support a long-term perspective in climate
policies. Advisory bodies can help to achieve
policy durability (Jordan and Moore, 2020) which
provides regulatory certainty for investments and
increases the credibility of government action
(Averchenkova, 2020a). For example the creation
of the UK CCC signals the UK Government’s
credible commitment to a low-carbon transition; this
creates a stable, predictable policy environment
that can encourage investment (Lockwood 2013,
2021). The UK CCC advises the government on the
level that it should set its carbon budgets 12 years
in advance. This helps avoid short-term political
cycles driving decision-making. Establishing an
expert climate change advisory body won’t instantly
improve a country’s performance but it can improve
mitigation and adaptation progress in the longer-
term (Abraham-Dukuma et al., 2020). One study
suggests that countries with climate legislation and
expert institutions, such as advisory bodies, might
be more able to effectively deliver climate
adaptation actions than countries without them
(Massey and Huitema, 2013).
They provide regular, mostly annual,
assessments of progress with a duty to respond
from governments, which maintains momentum
in climate action (Nash and Steurer, 2019). For
example, the UK CCC is mandated to annually
review the UK’s performance against its long-term
climate targets which makes it difficult for the
government to backslide and creates greater policy
ambition (Farmer et al., 2019).
They can engage the public and strengthen
public trust. Stakeholder engagement and
facilitation of public debate is a formal part of the
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advisory bodies is important, with the most impactful
bodies so far being independent, expert, small and
well-resourced. Apart from the case studies mentioned
there is little evidence yet of the depth of impact that
advisory bodies can have on enhancing climate
actions; time, further analysis and more research are
needed.
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Box 1: Four examples of the UK CCC’s impact on
national climate policy
First, the CCC was “deliberately designed to allow
Parliament to hold future Governments accountable for
the effectiveness of their climate programs” (Carter,
2014). It does this by providing an annual
decarbonisation progress report to UK Parliament and
devolved administrations. These reports publicly
expose shortfalls in Government policies (Farmer et al.,
2019). These reports also contain the CCC’s statutory
recommendations on actions needed to meet targets.
Second, Government is mandated to take into account
the CCC’s advice when setting carbon budgets
(Scotford and Minas, 2018). The 2008 Climate Change
Act’s (CCA) long-term goals, its creation of the CCC
and its reporting procedures make it challenging for
Government to backslide and creates inherent
pressure for greater, increased ambition (Farmer et al.,
2019). For example, the CCC's recommended 6th
Carbon Budget, under consideration by the
government, would bring forward the UK’s previous
80% emissions reduction target to 78% by 15 years
from 2050 to 2035 (CCC, 2020).
Third, the CCC has made the UK climate debate more
evidence-based because its mandated monitoring,
reporting and advising procedures are transparent
(Averchenkova et al., 2020b). As such, information
from the CCC is more trusted and respected than from
government or NGOs (ibid). The CCC’s evidence has
been used by all sides of the debate in Parliament,
particularly by Opposition to argue for greater climate
policy ambition (Averchenkova et al., 2018).
Finally, the CCC has played a “crucial role”
(Averchenkova et al., 2020b) in defining the UK’s
climate ambition. It has made a “material difference” to
UK climate policy by impacting parliamentary debate
and influencing new laws on energy, infrastructure and
housing (Averchenkova et al. 2018). For example, the
CCC was instrumental in the legislation of the 2013
Electricity Market Reform (ibid). Moreover, all five of
the statutory carbon budgets advised by the CCC have
been legislated by government (Lorenzoni and Benson,
2014; Nash and Steurer, 2019). Lockwood (2013)
argues that without the influence of the CCC the UK’s
fourth carbon budget would never have been agreed by
the Government. Between the CCA’s creation in 2008
and 2019 the UK’s emissions decreased by 30% (CCC,
2020).
Conclusion
An emerging literature is beginning to evidence the
influence that advisory bodies can have on national
climate policy. This influence is achieved through
transparent mandated reporting procedures,
contributions to evidence-based policymaking, publicly
reporting shortfalls in government progress, and
advising on feasible climate action. Climate Change
Acts that establish dedicated institutions, such as
expert advisory bodies, serve to institutionalise climate
change into policymaking; this makes it difficult to take
climate change off the political agenda (Nash and
Steurer, 2020). The composition and remit of climate
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